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An Empirical Analysis of the Resiliency of Ro/Ro and Ro/Pax Terminal 1 
Operations 2 
 3 
ABSTRACT 4 
Regular maritime lines with roll-on roll-off vessels must offer a reliable service without 5 
substantial cost increases in order to be competitive. Port terminals need to be able to respond 6 
quickly to any disturbance that might appear and return to a smooth operational state in the 7 
minimum amount of time (resilient terminals). In this paper a complete taxonomy of the 8 
disturbances affecting the operational processes in a roll-on roll-off terminal is introduced 9 
together with a system able to assess the performance of any measure used to mitigate them. 10 
The study is based on an overview of the existing literature on the topic, a detailed diagram of 11 
the operational processes of the terminal, and an exhaustive set of interviews of the staff 12 
involved in the processes occurring in a roll-on roll-off terminal, together with field 13 
measurements. The main vulnerabilities are identified and possible corrective and preventive 14 
measures are pointed out.  15 
16 
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1 INTRODUCTION 1 
Sea ports have experienced a boost in trade for the last decades. Nowadays more than 90% of 2 
international freight trade travels by ship and transoceanic sea trade trebled between 1968 and 3 
2008 (1). In the intracontinental scope, maritime transportation loses importance as it is less 4 
favoured compared to road transportation: within the European Union, almost 40% of 5 
domestic transportation of goods is done by sea, while 45.6% is done by road (2), the latter 6 
being more flexible.  7 
Seaborne trade in the shape of short sea shipping (SSS), understood as ‘movement of 8 
cargo and passengers by sea between ports within a sea area’ extrapolated from ‘official’ 9 
definition by the European Commission (3), has traditionally being favoured as the ‘clean’ 10 
alternative to road haulage. In fact, despite its role as the ‘green means of transportation’ has 11 
been downplayed (4), SSS comprehensive chains (door to door) continue to register fewer 12 
external costs (basically environment and congestion derived) than alternative transportation 13 
chains such as road (5, 6, 7) and it can be assumed that its ecological impact will decrease 14 
even more once vessels adapt to the reduction of SO2 emissions for maritime transportation 15 
and other policies under study by European and North American administrations (8, 9). 16 
SSS can also be competitive in terms of cost and time when compared with road 17 
transportation (10). This statement is especially true when using RoRo (roll-on roll-off) or 18 
RoPax (RoRo carrying passengers) ships (11) and the routes connecting both ports are 19 
motorways of the sea (MoS), understood as links between ports with higher requirements in 20 
terms of time, cost, flexibility, reliability, and resilience (12, 13). 21 
 RoRo and RoPax vessels specialize in cargo on wheels (full trucks, rolled platforms, 22 
trailers, automobiles, and even buses and trains). Ferry-like ships, aimed to the transportation 23 
of passengers instead of freight cargo are not considered as being RoPax for this paper’s 24 
purposes. 25 
The decisive aspects that make a transportation chain with a maritime link operated 26 
by RoRo/RoPax vessels competitive are both quantitative (time, frequency, or cost) and 27 
qualitative/subjective (14) Among the qualitative aspects considered, the shippers especially 28 
value the safety of the cargo together with the reliability (15), usually understood as 29 
fulfilment of the expected travel time (16, 17). Other authors, such as Paixão and Marlow 30 
(18) and Henesey (19), differentiate between quality and reliability. Henesey even 31 
differentiated resilience or adaptability from quality, considering that they are all key 32 
attributes for the success of any transportation chain.    33 
Reliability is important especially when dealing with regular services, that is, with a 34 
set schedule (20). But, what affects the reliability of SSS? Ports have been identified as the 35 
weakest link in any transportation chain that includes an SSS link (hereafter called an SSS 36 
chain) in terms of vulnerability or lack of resilience (21): Ports are break-bulk points and 37 
require smooth running in order to ease the modal shift and ensure the competitiveness of 38 
SSS chains when compared with other transportation chains (18) or even SSS chains calling 39 
at other ports (22). Any disturbance in the proper performance of the port might compromise 40 
all of the transportation chain (23). Paradoxically, and as stressed by Tang (24) and Barroso 41 
et al. (25), the actual trend toward just-in-time (JIT) practices (travel time reduction without 42 
increasing the operation costs) increases the vulnerability of the transportation chain.    43 
Resilient terminals are required; that is, port terminals need to be able to respond 44 
quickly to any disturbances that might appear and return to a smooth operational state in the 45 
minimum amount of time.  46 
The goal of this paper is to analyse the processes of a RoRo terminal and to identify 47 
the disruptive events that might occur during its running. The knowledge of the frequency of 48 
those events and how they affect time and cost, as a means of measuring the impact of their 49 
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consequences, makes it possible to establish which should be taken care of first. From there, 1 
it is possible to distinguish which were the most efficient measures for improving the 2 
robustness of the terminal operation. To help in the process, a compilation of interviews of 3 
different users and agents involved in the operation of several Spanish RoRo and RoPax 4 
terminals was used.    5 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the main terms 6 
used thorough the paper and how supply chain risk has been approached in the literature. 7 
Section 3 defines the main processes involving freight cargo in a RoRo/RoPax terminal. 8 
Section 4 identifies the most relevant events that might occur together with their causes and 9 
consequences and introduces the assessment system to be used. In Section 5 a compendium 10 
of measures is given with the aim of increasing the resiliency of the terminal. Finally, (in 11 
Section 6) some conclusions are presented. 12 
 13 
2 RESILIENCY, RISKS, DISRUPTIVE EVENTS, AND VULNERABILITY 14 
APPLIED TO THE SUPPLY CHAIN 15 
As stated by Ponomarov and Holcomb (26), the resiliency of a supply chain is its capacity to 16 
deal with unforeseen events, to respond to the disturbances they might cause, and to recover 17 
while maintaining the chain performance at a desired level. The ability to recover from any 18 
incident can be increased with redundancy in the resources and an increase in the flexibility 19 
on the protocols, timetables, and so on. While the first measure means a direct cost increase 20 
and will only be useful at the time the event happens, the second one can also bring benefits 21 
to day-to-day operation (27).  22 
At this point it is important to distinguish between risk and vulnerability. The first 23 
concept deals with events derived from the human action or the environment and their 24 
consequences. Vulnerability includes the study of the negative effects that the disturbances 25 
have on the optimal performance of the system (or supply chain, SC) in both the short and the 26 
long term. Vulnerability is tightly related to resilience: a resilient system is one that can 27 
survive and recover from disturbances and, because of that, has little vulnerability (28).  28 
In order to evaluate the resiliency of a specific process, it is necessary first to know 29 
what disturbances it might face and their severity. Precisely, Jüttner et al. (29) pointed out 30 
that supply chain risk management (SCRM) is based on four key aspects: assessing the 31 
sources of risk (causes), defining what adverse consequences they might have, identifying the 32 
risk (disturbance) drivers, and providing mitigating measures for the supply chain.  33 
According to Tang (24) and Kouvelis et al. (30), risk assessment in SCs is still in an 34 
embryonic state. A good starting point might be the study by Rao and Goldsby (31), who, 35 
following the steps of Ritchie and Marshall (32) in risk management, classified SC risks 36 
(disturbances) depending on the source/factor area (out of five) that produced them. The 37 
source could be related to the environment/context, industry, organization, specific problem, 38 
or decision-maker.   39 
In the meantime, the taxonomy of causes (or risk factors) developed by Sheffi and 40 
Rice (27) is especially relevant. Both consider that the causes can be internal or external. The 41 
former, in general terms, have a bigger influence on the day-to-day operation of the terminal 42 
and cover the following big areas/types: human resources, maintenance, human factors, 43 
organization and management, technical failures/hazards, and system attributes.  44 
Pettit et al. (33), after a process of recurrent analysis by means of eight focus groups, 45 
built up a complete taxonomy with 50 vulnerability factors (disruptive events) and 106 46 
capabilities. The disruptive events were grouped into seven broad categories: turbulence 47 
(frequent changes in external factors beyond the control of the system manager), deliberate 48 
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threats, external pressures, resource limitations, sensitivity, connectivity and supplier 1 
disturbances.  2 
When quantifying the consequences of the disturbance events, there is agreement on 3 
the opinion that both the probability of occurrence and the impact they would have on the 4 
system’s performance are to be taken into account. In that sense, in (27) and (28) a chart is 5 
used depicting the probability and impact (understood as the severity) of the disturbance 6 
faced by any system as a way to assess its vulnerability.  7 
In general, vulnerability in transportation chains that have a maritime link (like SSS) 8 
is considered to be higher than in any other kind of SC. Maritime logistic chains include more 9 
break-bulk points combined with an extremely complex port operation, intertwining logistic 10 
chains and multiple transportation means (34, 35).  11 
Specifically, Barnes and Oloruntoba (35) pointed out that there are two different 12 
approaches to vulnerability in seaborne transportation, depending on whether it has to do with 13 
overall logistics or the complexity of the processes in the terminal. Nedeß et al. (23) agreed to 14 
a certain degree and proposed distinguishing strategic and operational vulnerabilities when 15 
analysing the performance of maritime SCs. At the operational level they used a four-layered 16 
model for risk assessment: definition of the disruptive factors, the processes of the analysed 17 
system, the most probable events, and their consequences, whether or not they were 18 
monetary.  19 
This paper is based on the frameworks of Nedeß et al. (23), Sheffi and Rice (27), and 20 
Einarsson and Rausand (28) and uses the taxonomy developed by Pettit et al. (33) and 21 
exhaustive interviews of the different staff involved in the ship stevedoring process: 22 
stevedoring hands, ship staff, drivers, and eventually shippers, and port authority staff. The 23 
innovating contributions of this paper are twofold: building a complete taxonomy of the 24 
disruptive events that can affect the operational performance of a RoPax terminal and 25 
proposing a numerical framework to be used for estimating the real consequences that each 26 
event has on the performance in terms of frequency and severity.  27 
 28 
3 PROCESSES DESCRIPTION   29 
In a RoPax terminal, both administrative and logistic (operational) processes take place. To 30 
deal with the complexity of the system, port terminals are usually analysed in subsystems. 31 
RoPax terminals can be split into three subsystems: berth area, storage area, and delivery and 32 
receipt (36). 33 
 34 
Unloading process (from sea to land) 35 
When the ship is berthed and customs gives its approval, the unloading process starts. The 36 
typical unloading process begins with the vehicles driven by their own drivers: passenger 37 
automobiles, trucks, buses, and so on. The trucks and vehicles unloaded at this stage go 38 
directly to the exit gates of the terminal, where the exit control takes place. After that, the 39 
unloading process starts for all the vehicles/freight driven by the stevedoring team (i.e. 40 
hands): platforms/semitrailers and whole vehicles (i.e. cars, vans, etc. to be sold).  41 
 42 
Loading process (from land to sea) 43 
The cargo to be loaded on board arrives at the terminal either by road or by railroad. Once the 44 
cargo arrives at the terminal, it is parked in the yard, waiting to be loaded on board. The 45 
passengers on board may access through fingers or by means of the stern access gate.  46 
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Stevedoring is carried out according to the “Stevedoring Plan” which includes a 1 
“Cargo Manifest” and a “Cargo Plan”.  2 
Platforms and semitrailers are usually loaded first and simultaneously with the 3 
automobiles. Immediately after, the vehicles driven by their own drivers are loaded: 4 
passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, and so on. While waiting to be loaded, trucks and 5 
passenger vehicles are stored temporally in the yard of the terminal.   6 
The main processes in the day to day running of a RoRo/RoPax terminal are 7 
summarized in Figure 1.  8 
 9 
10 
 FIGURE 1 Main processes occurring in a RoPax terminal 11 
Besides the physical flows, there is a second circulation level corresponding to the 12 
information flow. Additionally, on each level, it is possible to distinguish among the different 13 
transport systems, cargo/stevedoring units, and types of cargo and traffic. In a RoPax terminal 14 
three main cargo types can be found: full trucks, platforms without tractor capacity, and 15 
automobiles. Each kind of cargo has its own process chain. Figure 2 describes the 16 
interrelations between all the processes occurring in a RoPax terminal in the storage area 17 
(storage subsystem). 18 
 19 
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 1 
FIGURE 2 Processes in the berth while stevedoring (export movements) 2 
 3 
 4 
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 1 
4 DISRUPTIVE EVENTS, CAUSES, AND DERIVED CONSEQUENCES 2 
 3 
Identifying the disruptive events 4 
In this paper, disturbance and disturbance are considered equivalent and are understood 5 
according to the definition given by (25): A disturbance is any event, predictable or not, 6 
which has a negative effect on the normal performance of the system. As established in the 7 
frameworks by Einarsson and Rausand (28) and Sheffi and Rice (27), these kinds of events 8 
happen because of certain threats or disruptive factors and cause certain consequences that 9 
may affect the normal performance to a greater or lesser degree.  10 
Three main sources were used to identify the main disturbances affecting the average 11 
performance of a RoPax terminal:  12 
 An overview of the literature describing the logistic processes in both RoRo 13 
and RoPax terminals. Moreover, the analysis was completed by identifying the 14 
incidents most frequently referred to in the literature on port container 15 
terminals, which was much more exhaustive.  16 
 A detailed analysis of the processes from Figure 2, identifying which agents 17 
might affect the desirable performance of the process and to what degree.  18 
 40 people were interviewed in total: 5 captains, 5 first deck officer, 10 deck 19 
officers, 5 consignees, 5 operations chief and managers, and 10 terminal’s 20 
customers from the RoPax terminals at Port of Barcelona, Port of Valencia, 21 
and Port of Algeciras. Among other questions, interviewees were asked about 22 
the frequency of the disruptive events previously identified and how they 23 
might affect the performance of the terminal. Table 1 resumes how and what 24 
was asked in the interviews. 25 
 26 
TABLE 1 Main characteristics and definitions of the survey   27 
Type of 
Questions 
and Answers 
(HOW) 
 Closed questions: The answer should be quantified between 1 (lowest 
punctuation) and 5 (most value).  
 Open questions: The agents surveyed should answer in short but shout 
mention the main problems and specify their point of view regarding the 
service quality received.  
Almost 80% of the surveys were done in situ and the rest was by internet or phone.  
Staff and 
agents 
surveyed 
(WHO) 
 Captain 
 First Deck Officer /Chief Engineer 
 Terminal’s customers and clients 
 Truckers 
 Consignee 
 Stevedores 
 Operations chief and managers 
Topics and 
main 
incidents in 
terminal 
processes  
(WHAT) 
 Terminal accesses and inland connections 
 Storage yard: layout and capacity 
 Ship design: car-decks, ramps and internal configuration 
 Quality, efficiency and productivity of stevedores  
 Main incidents and their consequences (frequency and probability). 
 Main variables and parameters that could be improved.  
 28 
 29 
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 1 
A specific taxonomy of disruptive events in RoPax (and RoRo) terminals has not been 2 
done to date. Some papers record the lack of reliability in terms of time and JIT policy 3 
fulfilment because of issues in the cargo handling at the port terminals (21).  4 
The literature is much larger in the case of ship breakdowns. The hull design of the 5 
rolled cargo ships makes them vulnerable to sinking. There are plenty of papers regarding 6 
risk of accident or sinking assessment. However, from the point of view of this paper, the 7 
accident (or breakdown) of the ship while at sea will only be considered in terms of its effect 8 
on the performance of the terminal: causing either a delay in the beginning of the loading and 9 
unloading processes or even the cancellation of some ships’ departures. In this sense, the 10 
article by Tzannatos (37) stands out. The author analysed the ship breakdowns in RoPax lines 11 
caused by the onboard equipment and, implicitly, how they affected the reliability. Tzannatos 12 
stressed that the ship failures, when they were inside the port, usually happened in the engine 13 
room, and to a lesser degree with the manoeuvring-propelling equipment and the deck 14 
equipment (ramps, anchor winches, and mooring capstans). 15 
The main risks (or disruptive events) identified after the thorough analysis of the 16 
existing literature, the interviews conducted, and the analysis of the processes are as follows: 17 
 I1: Estimated time of arrival (ETA) delay 18 
 I2: Estimated time of departure (ETD) delay 19 
 I3: Ramp–ship interface blocked or having low productivity  20 
 I4: Last-minute modification of the stevedoring plan  21 
 I5: Cargo fastening issues  22 
 I6: Congestion at the exit gates/lanes (land side)  23 
 I7: Congestion at the entry gates (land side)  24 
 I8: Accidents (stevedoring staff, drivers, passengers) 25 
 I9: Cargo away from the berthing point  26 
 I10: Insufficient storage area 27 
 I11: Cargo traceability issues  28 
 I12: Low productivity of the stevedoring processes (with stevedoring staff 29 
involved) 30 
 I13: Delay in the cargo loading  31 
 I14: Accidents or breakdowns of the equipment (towing units)  32 
 I15: Ship breakdown 33 
 I16: Interference with the normal performance of other ships 34 
 35 
Causes (or risk factors), consequences, and their relationship with the disturbances 36 
A vulnerability assessment must include, necessarily, the study of what the effects 37 
(consequences) of the identified disturbances are. The goal of this paper requires 38 
identification of what the causes are, the degree to which they cause the disturbances, and, 39 
from there, the probability of occurrence of certain consequences. Identifying causes and 40 
consequences is the fourth and last layer of those established by Nedeß et al. (23) as 41 
necessary to make the taxonomy of the vulnerabilities in the processes of a terminal.    42 
 The relationship between causes, disturbances, and eventually consequences makes it 43 
advisable to draw the relationship trees that intertwine them. Because of the relationship 44 
complexity of the physical processes that occur in a RoRo/RoPax terminal, building a global 45 
relationship tree is an overwhelming task, and its final result is likely to be difficult to handle. 46 
To make the study easier, the relationships between each possible disturbance and both its 47 
causes and its consequences were built independently, resulting in several trees with just one 48 
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connection level in each direction from the disruptive events themselves. The fact that the 1 
very same cause (risk factor) can cause multiple disturbances only means that it can appear in 2 
multiple trees. In a first iteration the focus was placed on identifying all the feasible causes 3 
and consequences of the disturbance. The resulting relationship trees were subsequently 4 
simplified, grouping causes (and consequences) with a similar profile. Figure 3 shows the 5 
construction of one of the trees in the first iteration while Figure 4 shows its simplified form.  6 
Once this level of definition was reached, a new complication was found: How should 7 
the situation be handled when disruptive events or final consequences cause new 8 
disturbances?  Eventually, such a possibility was allowed in the relationship trees, but with 9 
the requirement that the name and scope of the cause/disturbance/consequence were kept the 10 
same at all times, to avoid confusion and to allow them to be dealt with more easily 11 
afterwards.   12 
 13 
 14 
FIGURE 3 Tree (exhaustive) showing all the feasible causes and consequences derived 15 
from vehicle congestion at the gates of a terminal  16 
At this point, the taxonomy of causes, disturbances, and consequences was complete, 17 
and additionally the network of their main relationships was established. Annexes 1 and 2 18 
provide a complete listing of the taxonomies and the relationships existing between them.   19 
 20 
Disturbances assessment system 21 
The premise that the disturbances can be assessed using two different aspects (occurrence 22 
probability and the severity of the final consequences) (27, 28) is still valid. Because of that, 23 
the effort to establish, numerically, the relationship between each cause–disturbance and 24 
disturbance–consequence pair was made. That is, a probability value was assigned to each 25 
link in the relationship trees (Figures 4 and 5).  Note that each probability value is 26 
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independent from the others (i.e. the probabilities of the cause-disturbance that lead to certain 1 
disturbance will not add to 100). 2 
 3 
  4 
FIGURE 4 Simplified tree with the causes and consequences associated with vehicle 5 
congestion at the gates of a terminal 6 
It is considered that any disturbance Ij has n feasible causes and may lead to m 7 
different consequences. The probability of the incidence Ij happening because of the i-th 8 
cause, ci, will be known as p(Ij | ci). Whenever the cause i cannot happen or when its 9 
occurrence would not lead to the disturbance Ij, p(Ij | ci) takes a zero value. On the other hand, 10 
if it is assumed that there is a lack of correlation between any pair of causes leading to the 11 
event Ij (since all causes with a similar profile have been grouped together), the probability of 12 
occurrence of the event p(Ij) can be obtained as: 13 
1 2
1
( ) (  ) (  ) (  ) ... (  ) ... (  ),
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j j i j j j i j n
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p I p I c p I c p I c p I c p I c j

            (1)
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1 1 1
1
1
( ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) ...
... ( 1) (  )... (  ),
n n n
j j i j i j j j i j j j k
i i j n i j k n
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       

   
  
    (2)
However, it is necessary to know the probability of occurrence of the final 15 
consequences and their severity (to quantify the real impact on the performance of the 16 
terminal). In that sense, when considering that there are m distinct possible consequences and 17 
r disturbances that can lead to them, and maintaining the no-correlation hypothesis, the 18 
probability of occurrence of the k-th consequence (qk) can be expressed as: 19 
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safety of cargo and 
truckers
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normal performance of 
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its estimated end time
20%
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Then, the numbers assigned to the links between disturbances and final consequences 1 
reflect the probability of occurrence of the consequence because of the given disturbance. To 2 
quantify all the links available, the interviews were the main data source used, together with 3 
in situ measurements of operatives in 25 loading and unloading operations.  4 
Additionally, and in a first assessment of the problem, probability values associated 5 
with links where their causes are, at the same time, disturbances or consequences of other 6 
links were considered to be independent of the final probability of occurrence value 7 
associated, after calculation, with such disturbances or consequences; that is, the final 8 
probability of occurrence of a given consequence does not affect any cause–disturbance or 9 
disturbance–consequence link value, even when the consequence, cause, and/or disturbance 10 
might be the same. 11 
  12 
 13 
FIGURE 5 Sketch of the global existing links among causes, disturbances, and 14 
consequences. The probability values assigned to each link which are necessary to 15 
estimate p(q2) afterwards are highlighted in red.  16 
Additionally, each final consequence must be quantified in terms of severity. The 17 
values given at this stage are merely qualitative, having been assessed with the interview 18 
series as well as the knowledge of the processes occurring in the terminal. The categorical 19 
classification used has four severity levels: light, medium, severe, and very severe.   20 
The fact that the assessment of the consequences is qualitative makes it difficult to 21 
extrapolate it to the disturbances in order to evaluate them, especially when considering that 22 
it is possible to reach the same final consequence from multiple paths. Moreover, since the 23 
developed system allows it, evaluation of the effect of the disturbances implicitly, through 24 
their consequences, becomes more adequate. As a result, the vulnerability framework used in 25 
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Einarsson and Rausand (28) and Sheffi and Rice (27) now becomes a disturbances on the 1 
processes of the terminal framework (Figure 6). The consequences included in Figure 6 are:  2 
 ݍଵ: Ship departure cancellation  3 
 ݍଶ: Extra cost of handling stevedores  4 
 ݍଷ: Changes in berth/storage area (variation in the operational planning)  5 
 ݍସ: Issues with the entry/exit gate flows to/from the terminal (land gates)  6 
 ݍହ: Interfaces with the normal performance of other ships (I16)  7 
 ݍ଺: Concern for the safety and security of cargo and truckers 8 
 ݍ଻: Cargo fastening issues (I5) 9 
 ݍ଼: Internal (inside the ship) rehandles 10 
 ݍଽ: Yard reorganization 11 
 ݍଵ଴: Delay in the ship’s ETD (estimated time of departure) (can lead to I2 for 12 
the next incoming ship) 13 
 ݍଵଵ: Delay in the beginning of the stevedoring process 14 
 ݍଵଶ: Delay in the cargo exit time (land side) from its estimated value  15 
 16 
Changing the value (probability) of any of the links from any of the obtained 17 
relationship trees will result in a movement of the consequences on the chart in Figure 6 18 
(Figure 7) on the ordinates axis.  19 
 20 
 21 
FIGURE 6 Impacts on the processes of the terminal framework for a RoPax terminal. 22 
Feasible final consequences in the event of any disturbance in the processes. 23 
According to Figure 6 there are some final consequences that require little attention 24 
(q7, q8, q9, and q6) since they are infrequent and have low severity. The consequences with 25 
high probability and severe effects on the operative (q2, q10, q11, and, to a lower degree, q4) 26 
are where measures should be applied more urgently to reduce both the consequence severity 27 
(corrective measures) and its probability of occurrence (preventive measures). On the other 28 
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hand, those consequences that are frequent but have little impact on the performance (q3, q5, 1 
and, to certain degree, q12) are due to events happening on the average day, and should be 2 
addressed in order to improve the performance of the terminal. Finally, severe consequences 3 
that rarely happen (q1) should be taken into account, eventually, in order to establish some 4 
kind of preventive measure or protocol to be activated in case of occurrence, to allow a quick 5 
reaction and reduction in the severity of the negative consequences.  6 
The analysis undertaken stresses that, in the studied RoPax terminal, the disturbances 7 
that need to be addressed urgently are related to either the delay in the ship’s ETD, the delay 8 
in the beginning of the stevedoring process, or the extra costs incurred in hiring the 9 
stevedoring hand for a longer time period. In fact, these aspects are closely related since a 10 
delay in starting to load/unload the ship means a delay in its departure from the port, and an 11 
increase in the length of time for which the stevedoring hand must be hired.   12 
At the second level are the disturbances related with the congestion at the land gates 13 
of the terminal, as well as last minute changes in the yard distribution and planning forcing, 14 
in the later case, to extend (in time) the contract of the stevedoring team.   15 
Once the worst (and more probable) consequences are identified, it is time to discuss 16 
the paths that led to them, that is, to analyse the relationship trees followed to reach the 17 
common and severe final consequences (q2, q10, and q11). This time all possible loops due to 18 
consequences coinciding with causes and/or disturbances should be considered. Figure 7 19 
shows the complexity of the links leading to the final consequence q10 and the relative 20 
importance of the different connections with the potential disturbances and their causes 21 
leading to its occurrence. The q10 relationship tree happens to be the most complicated of all 22 
the trees considered and involves all the feasible disturbances to a greater or lesser degree 23 
and, thus, presumably a single measure affecting one or few initial causes will not have a 24 
huge effect on the final probability of occurrence of q10. 25 
 26 
 27 
FIGURE 7 Whole relationship tree for the final consequence q10 (delay in the ship’s 28 
ETD) (see Annexes 1 and 2 for a complete listing of the codes for each 29 
cause/consequence identified) 30 
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 1 
5 ASSESSMENT OF FEASIBLE MEASURES TO INCREASE THE RESILIENCE  2 
In the SCRM literature, two kinds of measures to improve the resilience are considered, 3 
depending on their target: the causes or the consequences of a given event that compromises 4 
the optimal performance of any SC. More specifically, Tomlin (38) differentiates between:   5 
 Preventive and mitigation actions. They affect the causes (risk factors), 6 
reducing their chance of happening, or the relationship between the causes and 7 
the disturbances themselves, (i.e. reducing the probability of occurrence of the 8 
disturbance when the cause has already occurred).  9 
 Contingency and corrective actions. They reduce the disruptive effects either 10 
in duration or severity. These measures are applied only if the disturbance 11 
takes place.  12 
 13 
Translated into the consequences framework of Figure 6, it can be considered that 14 
preventive measures are aimed at reducing the probability of occurrence of the disturbance 15 
while contingency measures are aimed at reducing the severity level, that is, reducing the 16 
severity value on the abscissa axis of Figure 6. However, it has to be taken into account that 17 
some preventive measures might reduce the severity of the final consequences, becoming 18 
both preventive and mitigation measures.   19 
Assessment of the measures affecting the resiliency of a RoPax terminal is out of the 20 
scope of this paper. A first approach to the families of measures available was made using the 21 
developed taxonomy of causes, disturbances, and consequences, that is: 22 
 Agreements between terminals  23 
 Management improvement and cargo traceability (investment in technology)  24 
 Stevedore trainmen  25 
 Quality control and management  26 
 Investment in equipments (overcapacity and better performance)  27 
 Investment in infrastructure (overcapacity)  28 
 29 
Almost every single disruptive event leads to a delay in the stevedoring process. This 30 
can be reduced by contracting extra stevedoring units, which is one of the most used 31 
corrective actions available to the shipping company. Once again, and considering the 32 
taxonomy of causes, disruptive events, and final consequences, it is possible to suggest the 33 
following main lines of corrective actions:   34 
 Increase flexibility of the stevedoring workforce/Adapting stevedoring units to 35 
the needed work 36 
 Financial/monetary compensation (to customers) 37 
 Express (rapid) repairs (breakdowns) 38 
 Temporary equipment rental 39 
 Express training (terminal/ship/stevedoring staff) 40 
 41 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 42 
The goal of this paper was to elaborate the taxonomy of the disturbances affecting the 43 
operational processes in a RoPax terminal. The study is based on an overview of the existing 44 
literature on the topic, a detailed diagram of the operational processes of the terminal, and an 45 
exhaustive set of interviews with the staff involved in the processes occurring in a RoPax 46 
terminal together with field measures. 47 
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In this study the following conclusions have been obtained:  1 
 A complete taxonomy of the disturbances that happen in a RoPax terminal has 2 
been developed. In addition, a framework to evaluate their consequences on 3 
the normal performance of the terminal, in terms of severity and frequency, 4 
has been built.  5 
 Delay in the ship departure, delay in the beginning of the stevedoring process, 6 
and extra costs incurred after hiring the stevedoring hand for a longer time 7 
period (when the stevedoring process takes longer than expected) are the most 8 
common disruptive events a RoRo/RoPax terminal can face.  9 
 10 
Assigning a ‘single’ number to each relationship might be oversimplifying since the 11 
‘intensity’ of the disturbance is never evaluated, for instance lack of storage area can have 12 
small or high final consequences depending on how much extra area is needed. This is 13 
somehow addressed already by using the set of values in the disturbance-consequences links, 14 
since in the interviews and terminal records, ‘more intense’ disturbances will be accounted 15 
for with more probability. However, this paper would benefit from a further research on how 16 
to work with fuzzy or probability values instead of ‘single values’ and their effect on the 17 
consequences framework and relationship trees used in this paper as well as a larger set of 18 
terminal records conducted specifically to quantify the disturbances. 19 
 20 
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ANNEX 1 Causes 1 
Code Cause 
c1 Accidents with stevedoring staff involved 
c2 Cargo arrival before its expected time 
c3 Route change (ship) 
c4 Accidents/breakdowns with drivers/passengers involved 
c5 Adverse weather 
c6 IPSI security controls too slow, too thorough, or lacking in a specific area  
c7 Deficiencies in the coordination/planning of the stevedoring process 
c8 Lack of cargo control, traceability 
c9 Delay in the truck loading (last in, first out effect) 
c10 Deficiencies in the terminal design (berthing line) 
c11 Deficiencies in the terminal design (lanes) 
c12 Deficiencies in the terminal design (storage area insufficient) 
c13 Deficiencies in the terminal design (entry gates too few or with low performance)
c14 Deficiencies in the terminal design (insufficient manoeuvring areas) 
c15 Deficiencies in the terminal design (signalling) 
c16 Deficiencies in the ship design 
c17 Untrained stevedoring staff, unqualified personnel 
c18 Lack of training for particular fastening issues 
c19 Lack of stevedoring staff 
c20 
Lack of machinery spare parts, idle machinery (towing equipment), and/or 
machinery repairs 
c21 Deficiencies in the management of the terminal 
c22 Unforeseen events (boarding, running aground) 
c23 Ship issues/breakdowns 
c24 Interference with the normal performance of other ships (yard operations) 
c25 Deficiencies in the deck maintenance 
c26 Deficiencies in the maintenance of the ship access points 
c27 Deficiencies in the maintenance of the fastening points (inside the ship) 
c28 Deficiencies in the ship maintenance 
c29 Deficiencies in the stevedoring equipment maintenance 
c30 Overbooking of cargo/passengers 
c31 Crew issues 
c32 Pilotage issues (delay or accident) 
c33 
Mechanical issues with vehicles stored in the yard for a long time (flat tyres, 
unloaded batteries, etc.) 
c34 
Delay in the beginning of the loading/unloading (delay in arrival of the cargo 
inside the terminal, congestion at the terminal entries) 
c35 Delay in the cargo arrival at the terminal (land side) 
c36 Delay in the estimated time for ending the loading/unloading process 
c37 Delay in the estimated time for ending the maintenance of the ship 
c38 Delay in the ship's ETD (estimated time of departure)  
c39 Vehicles with special needs when fastened 
c40 Last-minute changes in the stevedoring planning (berth or storage area change) 
c41 Changes in the stevedoring planning (ship), not updated 
 2 
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 1 
ANNEX 2 Linkage between disruptive events and their causes and consequences 2 
Code Disturbance Causes Final consequences
I1 Estimated time of arrival (ETA) delay c5, c23(I15),c38 (q10) q2, q5, q9, q11 
I3 
Ramp/ship interface blocked or with low 
productivity 
c1(I14), c4(I8),c10, c16, 
c23(I15), c34 (q12) 
q2, q5, q10 
I4 
Last-minute modifications of the stevedoring 
plan 
c3, c26,c41 q2, q8, q10 
I5 Cargo fastening issues c18, c25,c27, c39 q7, q10 
I6(q4) Congestion at the exit gates/lanes (land side) c6, c11,c24(q5) q5, q11, q12 
I7 Congestion at the entry gates (land side) 
c9, c12,13,14,c24(q5), 
c30, c35 
q4, q5, q6, q11 
I8 
Accidents (stevedoring staff, drivers, 
passengers) 
c5, c12,14,15, I9 q5, q10, q11 
I9 Cargo away from the berthing point c21, c40 (q3) q2 
I10 Insufficient storage area c2, c12,c30, c34 (q12) q2, q3, q4 
I11 Cargo traceability issues c8, c21, I10 q10 
I12 
Low productivity of the stevedoring processes 
(with stevedoring staff involved) 
c1(I14), c4,c17, c19 q2, q5, q10 
I13 Delay in the cargo loading c4, c6,c9, c33 q5, q10 
I14 
Accidents/breakdowns of the equipment 
(towing units) 
c5, c17,c20, c29 q10 
I15 Ship breakdown c22, c28, c31, 32, 37 q1, q10 
I16 
Interference with the normal performance of 
other ships 
c7, c24(q5) q2, q10 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
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